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Résumé: Le problème d’allocations stables généralise les problèmes d’affectations
stables (" one-to-one ", " one-to-many " ou " many-to-many ") à l’attribution
de quantités  réelles ou d’heures. Il existe deux ensembles d’agents distincts,
un ensemble I " employés " et un ensemble J " employeurs " où chaque agent
a un ordre de préférences sur les agents de l’ensemble opposé et chacun a un
certain nombre d’heures. Comme dans les cas spécifiques, le problème
d’allocations stables peut contenir un nombre exponentiel de stables (quoique
dans le cas " générique " il admet exactement une  allocation stable).
Un mécanisme est une fonction qui sélectionne exactement une allocation
stable pour n’importe quel problème. Le mécanisme " optimal-employés " qui
sélectionne toujours l’allocation stable optimale pour les employés est
caractérisé comme étant l ‘unique mécanisme " efficace " ou  " monotone " ou
" strategy-proof. "
Abstract: The stable allocation problem is the generalization of the well-known and
much studied stable (0,1)-matching problems to the allocation of real numbers
(hours or quantities). There are two distinct sets of agents, a set I of
"employees" or "buyers" and a set J of "employers" or "sellers", each agent
with preferences over the opposite set and each with a given available time or
quantity. In common with its specializations, and allocation problem may
have exponentially many stable solutions (though in the "generic" case it has
exactly one stable allocation).
A mechanism is a function that selects exactly one stable allocation for any
problem. The "employee-optimal" mechanism XI that always selects xI, the
"employee-optimal" stable allocation, is characterized as the unique one that
is, for employees, either "efficient", or "monotone", or "strategy-proof."
Mots clés : affectation stable, mariage stable, couplage stable, transport ordinal, problème
d'admission, many-to-many matching, two sided market
Key Words : stable assignment, stable marriage, stable matching, ordinal trasportation,
university admissions, two-sided market, many-to-many matching.
Classification AMS: 91B68, 91B26, 90B06, 91A35
                                                           
1
 Université Blaise Pascal, CUST, B.P. 206 - 63174 Aubière Cedex, and Ecole Polytechnique, Laborattoire
d'Econométrie. e-mail: baiou@custsv.univ-bpclermont.fr.
2
 CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'Economiétrie, 1 rue Descartes,  75005 Paris. e-mail:
balinski@poly.polytechnique.fr
Introdution
The stable marriage (or stable one-to-one) problem is the simplest example of a
two-sided market. There are two distint sets of agents, e.g., men and women,
and eah agent on one side of the market has preferenes over the opposite set.
Mathings between men and women are sought that are stable in the sense
that no man and woman not mathed (to eah other) an both be better-o
by being mathed [7℄. The stable admissions (or stable one-to-many) problem
is a more general example of a two-sided market, again with two sets of agents
eah having preferenes over the opposite set. On one side of the market there
are individuals, e.g., prospetive students, interns or employees, and on the
other there are institutions, e.g., universities, hospitals or rms, eah seeking
to enroll some given number of individuals [7℄. A still more general ase is
the stable polygamous polyandry (or stable many-to-many) problem where every
agent seeks to enroll given numbers of agents of the opposite set [2℄. All of these
are problems of assignment: agents are mathed with agents [7, 9, 8, 10℄.
The stable alloation problem [3℄ is also a two-sided market with distint
sets of agents where eah agent has strit preferenes over the opposite set. But
here eah agent is endowed with real numbers  quantities or hours of work
 and instead of mathing (or alloating 0's and 1's) the problem is to alloate
real numbers. For example, one set of agents onsists of workmen eah with a
number of available hours of work, the other of employers eah seeking a number
of hours of work. Stability asks that no pair of opposite agents an inrease
their hours together either due to unused apaity or by giving up hours with
less preferred partners.
Here, as is often true, the study of the more general problem laries and in
some aspets simplies the issues and views that onern the partiular ases.
Setion 1  the problem  presents the model and Setion 2  stable
alloations  summarizes the salient fats onerning them, their existene,
struture and properties (see [3℄).
An alloation mehanism is a funtion that selets a unique stable alloa-
tion for any alloation problem. Setion 3  mehanisms  uniquely harater-
izes the employee- and employer-optimal (or row- and olumn-optimal) alloation
mehanisms in terms of three separate properties: eieny, monotoniity,
and strategy-proofness. This generalizes to stable alloations similar hara-
terizations rst established for admissions or one-to-many mathing [6, 1℄, then
for many-to-many mathing [2℄.
1 The problem
A stable alloation problem ( ; s; d; ) is speied by a direted graph   dened
over a grid, and arrays of real numbers s; d > 0 and   0, as follows. There
are two distint nite sets of agents, the row-agents I (employees) and the
olumn-agents J (employers), and eah agent has a strit preferene order
over the agents of the opposite set. Eah employee i 2 I has s(i) units of work
1
to oer, eah employer j 2 J seeks to obtain d(j) units of work, and (i; j) is
the maximum number of units that i 2 I may ontrat with j 2 J . This data
is modeled as a graph.
The nodes of the preferene graph   are the pairs of opposite agents (i; j),
i 2 I and j 2 J . They are taken to be loated on the I J grid where eah row
orresponds to an employee or supplier i 2 I and eah olumn to an employer
or aquirer j 2 J . The (direted) ars of  , or ordered pairs of nodes, are of
two types: a horizontal ar
 
(i; j); (i; j
0
)

expresses supplier i's preferene for j
0
over j (sometimes written j
0
>
i
j), symmetrially a vertial ar
 
(i; j); (i
0
; j)

expresses aquirer j's preferene for i
0
over i (sometimes written i
0
>
j
i). If
(i; j) = 0 for some (i; j) then the node may be omitted. Ars implied by
transitivity are omitted. Figure 1 gives an example where the values s(i) are
assoiated with rows, the values d(j) with olumns, and the values (i; j) are
arbitrarily large.
The stable marriage problem is the stable alloation problem with s(i) =
d(j) = 1 and (i; j) = 0 or 1, for all i 2 I; j 2 J ; the stable university
admissions problem is the stable alloation problem with s(i) positive integers,
d(j) = 1 and (i; j) = 0 or 1, for all i 2 I; j 2 J ; and the stable many-to-many
problem is the stable alloation problem with s(i) and d(j) positive integers,
and (i; j) = 0 or 1, for all i 2 I; j 2 J (see [4, 5, 2℄).
It is onvenient, and unambiguous, to refer to the suessors of a node  or
to say a node follows another  in its row or olumn, meaning they or it are
preferred or ranked higher. And, similarly, to refer to the predeessors of a node
 or to say a node preedes another  in its row or olumn, meaning they or
it are less preferred or ranked lower. Also a rst, least preferred (or last, most
preferred) node in a row or olumn has no predeessors (no suessors)  and
a rst (or last) node with ertain properties has no predeessors (no suessors)
with those properties.
In general, if S is a set and y(s); s 2 S, a real number, then y(S)
def
=
P
s2S
y(s); also (r; S)
def
= f(r; s) : s 2 Sg. For (i; j) 2  , (i; j

)
def
= f(i; l) : l 
i
jg and (i; j
>
)
def
= f(i; l) : l >
i
jg; the sets (i

; j) and (i
>
; j) are dened similarly.
An alloation x =
 
x(i; j)

of a problem ( ; s; d; ) is a set of real-valued
numbers satisfying
x(i; J)  s(i); all i 2 I;
x(I; j)  d(j); all j 2 J;
0  x(i; j)  (i; j); all (i; j) 2  ;
alled, respetively, the row, the olumn and the entry onstraints. In Figure
1 both y and z are alloations of the example. It may be  and will be 
assumed that (i; j)  min

s(i); d(j)
	
.
An alloation x is stable if for every (i; j) 2  ,
x(i; j) < (i; j) implies x(i; j

)s(i) or x(i

; j) = d(j):
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If for some (k; l) this ondition fails, then (k; l) bloks x: agents k 2 I and
l 2 J may together, ignoring others, improve the alloation for themselves.
Speially, the value of x(k; l) may be inreased by Æ > 0, with x(k; j) > 0 for
some j <
k
l dereased by Æ (or x(k; J) < s(k)) and x(i; l) > 0 for some i <
l
k
dereased by Æ (or x(I; l) < d(l)). Otherwise, (k; l) is stable for x. In partiular,
if either x(k; l) = (k; l) or x(k; l

) = s(k) then (k; l) is row-stable; and if either
x(k; l) = (k; l) or x(k

; l) = d(l) then (k; l) is olumn-stable  so a node may
be both row- and olumn-stable.
In the speial ase of marriage, (k; l) bloks when man k and woman l are
not mathed
 
x(k; l) = 0

, k is not mathed or is mathed to a less desirable
woman than l
 
x(k; l

) = 0

, l is not mathed or mathed to a less desirable
man than k
 
x(k

; l) = 0

, and (k; l) = 1: thus together k and l an realize
a better solution for themselves. In Figure 1, y is not stable  (4; 3) bloks y
(the other nodes are stable for y)  whereas z is stable.
(1)=10
d(1)=
10
1 11
14
12 17
y=
z=
11
14
6 12
7 3
2
1
s
(2)=12
s
s
(3)=14
(4)=20
d d d(2)= (3)= (4)=
11 13 15 17
s
Figure 1: An alloation problem (no upper bounds ).
2 Stable alloations
This setion summarizes the pertinent fats onerning stable alloations. For
proofs and a more omplete desription, see [3℄.
The employee- or row-greedy solution  of a problem ( ; s; d; ) is dened by
assigning to eah row-agent i 2 I his/her/its preferred solution ating as if there
were no other row agents. It is dened reursively, beginning with i's preferred
hoie (the last node in row i):
(i; j) = min

s(i)  (i; j
>
); d(j); (i; j)
	
:
If no olumn onstraint is violated,  is a stable alloation. In terms of marriage,
 assigns to eah man his favorite available woman, and if no woman is assigned
more than one man it is a stable assignment. The employer- or olumn-greedy
solution ( ; s; d; ) is dened similarly.
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When the men, in marriage, propose to their preferred women, a woman
who reeives a proposal may disard every man lower in her preferenes without
hanging the problem. A similar fat holds for alloation problems. If x is a
stable alloation of a problem ( ; s; d; ), then
x(i; j)  

(i; j)
def
= max
n
0; min

(i; j); d(j)  (i
>
; j)
	
o
;
and the problems ( ; s; d; ) and ( ; s; d; 

) are equivalent in the sense that
they admit exatly the same set of stable alloations.
This suggests the generalization of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, the row-
greedy algorithm: try the row-greedy solution ; if it is an alloation then it must
be a stable alloation; otherwise, new stronger bounds may be dedued and the
proess repeated. For disrete problems  when s; d and  are integer-valued
 the proedure must terminate with a problem whose row-greedy solution is
stable, so proves:
Theorem 1 There exist stable alloations for every stable alloation problem
( ; s; d; ).
The theorem is proven for arbitrary real-valued data via an indutive al-
gorithm [3℄ that is strongly polynomial: it requires at most 3jI jjJ j+ jJ j steps
to nd a stable alloation, where jKj is the ardinality of K. In fat, the row-
greedy algorithm is arbitrarily bad for disrete problems, and it is not known
whether it onverges at all in the general ase.
Confronted with any two stable alloations an agent has no hesitation in
deiding whih he, she or it prefers. Formally, any two stable alloations x and
y may be ompared with the denition that follows
x
def

i
y; i 2 I; if x(i; k) < y(i; k) implies x(i; j) = 0 for j <
i
k; (1)
read row-agent i prefers x to y or is indierent between them. x
def
=
i
y when
x(i; ) = y(i; ), meaning i is indierent between x and y (impliitly how others
fare is of no importane to i), and x
def

i
y when x 
i
y and x 6=
i
y. Symmetri
denitions hold for olumn-agents j 2 J .
x 
i
y implies x(i; j) < y(i; j) is true for at most one x(i; j) > 0. In
partiular, if x 
i
y then x(i; k) < y(i; k) and x(i; j) > y(i; j) imply k <
i
j.
Sine eah agent is assigned exatly the same total number of hours by every
stable alloation, row-agent i prefers x to y, or x 
i
y, implies that y may be
transformed into x by dereasing some values that orrespond to less-preferred
olumn-agents and inreasing others that orrespond to more-preferred olumn-
agents.
In eet, the simplest omplete desription of an agent's preferenes between
stable alloations is the min-min riterion: the value of the least-preferred type
of hour should be as small as possible. Letting i(x) = j
 
if x(i; j
 
) > 0 and
x(i; j) = 0 for j < j
 
, this means
4
x 
i
y if

either i(x) >
i
i(y)
or i(x) = i(y) = j
 
and x(i; j
 
) < y(i; j
 
):
(2)
The opposition of interests between rows and olumns holds here too:
Theorem 2 If x; y are stable and x(k; l) 6= y(k; l), then x 
k
y for k 2 I if and
only if x 
l
y for l 2 J .
Morevoer, it is easy to verify that the set of all stable alloations is a dis-
tributive lattie with respet to the partial order 
I
on the preferenes of all
row-agents I dened by:
x
def

I
y if x
i
y for all i 2 I:
Surprisingly, onsiderable more is true. When the data s > 0, d > 0 and
(i; j)  0 are arbitrary real numbers it is to be expeted that no sum of a
subset of the s(i) equals the sum of a subset of the d(j), nor that suh sums are
equal when the s(i) and d(j) are eah redued by a sum of some orresponding
(i; j): this is the generi, strongly nondegenerate problem. In this ase the
problem has a unique stable alloation.
Aordingly, it is only due to the degeneraies of the stable one-to-one, one-
to-many and many-to-many mathing problems that the rih lattie struture
 potentially involving exponentially many stable alloations  ours. But
the data of a stable alloation problem is often integer valued and may well
admit degeneraies and so multiple stable alloations. Thus it is neessary to
have a rationale for hoosing one stable alloation in the presene of many.
The example given above is suh an instane. It has exatly 7 extreme stable
alloations  meaning stable alloations that are not a onvex ombination of
others. They are given in Figure 2. The stable alloation z of Figure 1 is not
extreme: z =
3
10
x
3
+
7
10
x
4
. When the data is integer-valued there always exist
stable alloations in integers.
3 Mehanisms
An alloation mehanism  is a funtion that selets exatly one stable alloation
for any problem ( ; s; d; ). Three haraterization are given of eah of two
partiularly onspiuous mehanisms. This generalizes known results for the
one-to-many [6, 1℄ and many-to-many mathing problems [2℄.
The employee- or row-optimal stable alloation x
I
of a problem ( ; s; d; ) is
dened by:
x
I

i
x; all i 2 I; for every stable alloation x:
x
I
attributes to every row-agent the best possible alloation among all stable
alloations. The row-optimal algorithm [3℄ establishes
5
xJ= x =1
10
5
10
12
411
9 5
x =3
25
10
13
14
111
x =2
5
10
132
9
14
3
5
10
12
132
9 5
14
11
15
10
1
2 32
14
111
153
10
x4= x5=
xI =
14
152 3
111
Figure 2: All extreme stable alloation: arrows show olletive preferenes 
I
(in this ase a omplete order).
Theorem 3 Every problem ( ; s; d; ) has a unique row-optimal stable alloa-
tion x
I
.
By symmetry, every problem has a unique employer- or olumn-optimal stable
alloation x
J
. So two obvious examples of mehanisms are the employee- or
row-optimal mehanism 
I
that always selets x
I
, and the employer- or olumn-
optimal mehanism 
J
that always selets x
J
.
Eieny
It would be agreeable if it ould be asserted that the employee-optimal meh-
anism 
I
is eient in that no alloation, stable or not, is ever better for
the employees than the employee-optimal stable alloation x
I
. This depends,
of ourse, on what is meant by better: in an intuitive sense the alloation y
given in Figure 1 is olletively preferred to x
I
by the employees I (y is bloked
by (4; 3)). But by the min-min riterion (2) for omparing stable alloations,
row-agent 4 would be indierent between x
I
and y. The denition of better
will extend the min-min riterion to arbitrary alloations.
Consider now a problem where the s(i); i 2 I are generous in omparison
with the d(j); j 2 J , as in Figure 3. The employee-optimal stable alloation
x
I
is viiously employee-ineient: every alloation, stable or not, that gives
a total of 7 hours to employee 1 and a total of 11 to employee 2 is better
for the employees. Thus if x
I
is in some sense eient this possibility must
be exluded: aordingly, when x
I
(i; J) < s(i) any other alloation y with
y(i; J) = x(i; J) will be onsidered equally preferred by i.
Guided by these examples, extend the denition of an employee's preferenes
between stable alloations (2) to preferenes between arbitrary alloations x and
y as follows:
6
3 4 0 0
0 0 5 6
xI =
6
11
11
3 4 5
Figure 3: x
I
ineient.
x
def

i
y if
i(x) <
i
i(y) or
i(x) = i(y) = l
 
; x(i; j
 
) < y(i; j
 
)

when x(i; J) = y(i; J) = s(i)
x(i; J) > y(i; J) when y(i; J) < s(i):
Also, row agent i is indierent between two alloations, x 
i
y, if i(x) = i(y) =
j
 
and x(i; j
 
) = y(i; j
 
) when x(i; J) = y(i; J) = s(i), or if x(i; J) = y(i; J) <
s(i). Take x 
i
y to mean x 
i
y or x 
i
y. As before,
x
def

I
y if x 
i
y for all i 2 I;
and x
def

I
y if x 
I
y and x 
i
y is not true for all i 2 I .
A preliminary lemma onerning stable alloations is needed.
Lemma 1 Suppose that x is a stable alloation and y is an alloation, stable or
not, for whih y 
i
x for all i 2 I. Then there exists a stable alloation y


I
x.
Moreover,
(i) x(i; J) = y(i; J) = y

(i; J) = s(i) for every i 2 I,
(ii) x(I; j) = y(I; j) = y

(I; j) for every j 2 J , and
(iii) y

(i; j) > x(i; j) implies there exists h 
j
i for whih y(h; j) > x(h; j).
Proof. To begin, suppose that for some j 2 J , x(I; j) < y(I; j). Then x(i; j) <
y(i; j) for some i 2 I . If x(i; J) < s(i) then (i; j) bloks x, a ontradition;
and if x(i; J) = s(i) then y 
i
x implies x(i; j
0
) > y(i; j
0
) for some j
0
<
i
j,
so (i; j) bloks x, again a ontradition. Therefore, x(I; j)  y(I; j) for all
j 2 J , and x(I; J)  y(I; J). But y 
i
x means x(i; J)  y(i; J) for i 2 I , so
x(I; J)  y(I; J) and the inequalities are all equations. Finally, x(i; J) < s(i)
implies x(i; J) < y(i; J) so x(i; J) = y(i; J) = s(i).
Let  =
 
i; i(x)

: i 2 I
	
. By denition, x
 
i; i(x)

> y
 
i; i(x)

for every
 
i; i(x)

2 . From above it follows that for eah
 
i; i(x)

2  there is at
least one h 2 I with x
 
h; i(x)

< y
 
h; i(x)

 
 
h; i(x)

. But y 
h
x implies
 
h; h(x)

preedes
 
h; i(x)

in row h. Therefore, it must be that h <
i(x)
i sine
otherwise x would not be stable.
7
Among all row agents i
0
<
i(x)
i for whih
 
i
0
; i
0
(x)

preedes
 
i
0
; i(x)

and
x
 
i
0
; i(x)

< (
 
i
0
; i(x)

, let i

be the olumn-agent that i(x) prefers. Note that
h may be i

; but if i

6= h then h <
i(x)
i

. Call 

the set of all suh nodes.
By onstrution, every node of 

is preeded in its row by a node of  and
is followed by every node of  in its olumn, so the nodes of [

must ontain
a yle C. Moreover, if in olumn j a node (i; j) follows a node of 

[ C and
preedes a node of  [ C, it must be that (i; j) is row-stable relative to x.
Let
Æ(i; j) =

x(i; j) if (i; j) 2 C \ ;
(i; j)  x(i; j) if (i; j) 2 C \ 

Æ = minfÆ(i; j) : (i; j) 2 Cg;
and dene
y

(i; j) =
8
<
:
x(i; j)  Æ if (i; j) 2 C \ ;
x(i; j) + Æ if (i; j) 2 C \ 

;
x(i; j) if (i; j) =2 C:
y

is learly an alloation satisfying y


I
x and the onditions (i), (ii) and
(iii). It is also stable: the only nodes (i; j) that ould blok or beome unstable
are those that preede a node of C \ but sueed a node of C\

in a olumn
j. But suh nodes were row-stable and so remain row-stable.
An alloation x is eient for employees or row-eient if there is no allo-
ation y, stable or not, satisfying
y 
i
x for all i 2 I:
A mehanism is employee- or row-eient if it always selets an row-eient
stable alloation.
Theorem 4 
I
is the unique row-eient mehanism.
Proof. Clearly, no mehanism other than 
I
an be row-eient; aordingly,
it is only neessary to show that 
I
is row-eient. So suppose the ontrary:
there exists for some problem an alloation y, y 
i
x
I
for all i 2 I . Then by
Lemma 1 there exists a stable alloation y


I
x
I
, ontraditing Theorem 3.
A bloking theorem
The next theorem is the key to establishing the remaining two harateriza-
tions. Although the analog of a similar result for stable assignment problems,
its proof invokes a new idea whih leads to a muh simpler proof of that result.
Theorem 5 If in a problem P = ( ; s; d; ), y is an alloation stritly preferred
to x
I
by eah of the agents i 2 I
0
but none of the agents i =2 I
0
, then some node
(i; j) with i =2 I
0
bloks y.
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Proof. If x is an alloation of P , its restrition to I
0
 J is denoted x
jI
0
.
Let d
0
(j)
def
= x
I
(I
0
; j)  d(j) for j 2 J , and onsider the subproblem P
0
=
( 
0
; s
0
; d
0
; 
0
), where  
0
is   restrited to I
0
J , s
0
(i) = s(i); i 2 I
0
, and 
0
(i; j) =
(i; j) over  
0
. Then x
IjI
0
, is a stable alloation of P
0
, and y
jI
0
is an alloation
of P
0
that satises y
jI
0

i
x
IjI
0
for all i 2 I
0
. By Lemma 1, there exists a stable
alloation y

of P
0
, with y


I
0
x
IjI
0
, and
x
I
(i; J) = y(i; J) = y

(i; J) = s(i) for i 2 I
0
; and
x
I
(I
0
; j) = y(I
0
; j) = y

(I
0
; j) for j 2 J:
(3)
Aordingly, if x
I
(i; j) < y(i; j) for i 2 I
0
then x
I
(i; j
0
) > y(i; j
0
) for some
j
0
<
i
j. The stability of x
I
then implies x
I
(i

; j) = d(j), so (i; j) must be
followed in its olumn by a node (i
0
; j) with x
I
(i
0
; j) > y(i
0
; j). If i
0
=2 I
0
then the theorem is proven: (i
0
; j) bloks y beause either y(i
0
; J) < s(i
0
) or
y(i
0
; J) = s(i
0
), x
I

i
0
y and x
I
(i
0
; j) > y(i
0
; j) implies that x
I
(i
0
; j
0
) < y(i
0
; j
0
)
for some j
0
<
i
0
j. Therefore, it may be assumed that
x
I
(i; j) < y(i; j); i 2 I
0
implies x
I
(i
0
; j)  y(i
0
; j) for i
0
=2 I
0
; i
0
>
j
i: (4)
Extend the denition of y

to all of I  J by
y

(i; j) =

y

(i; j) i 2 I
0
;
x
I
(i; j) i =2 I
0
:
Clearly, y

is an alloation of P satisfying y


I
x
I
, so y

annot be stable.
Suppose (k; l) bloks y

: it is rst shown that k =2 I
0
, then that (k; l) in fat
bloks y (as well as y

).
Suppose k 2 I
0
.
y

is stable in P
0
, so either y

(k; l

) = s(k) or y

(k

; l) = d
0
(l). Therefore,
sine (k; l) bloks y

in P , y

(k; l

) < s(k) and y

(k

; l) = d
0
(l). The fat
y


k
x
I
implies x
I
(k; l

)  y

(k; l

) < s(k), so (k; l) has predeessors in row
k, (k; j
0
); (k; j
00
) with x
I
(k; j
0
) > 0; y

(k; j
00
) > 0.
But x
I
is stable, so either (a) x
I
(k; l) = (k; l), or (b) x
I
(k

; l) = d(l) and
x
I
(k; l) < (k; l).
Case (a) annot be true sine x
I
(k; l) = (k; l) > y

(k; l) and y


i
x
I
imply
y


i
x
I
so y

(k; j) = 0 for all j <
k
l, ontraditing y

(k; j
00
) > 0.
In ase (b), x
I
(k

; l) = d(l) implies x
I
(i; l) = 0 for all i <
l
k. Moreover,
sine y

is stable in P
0
, y

(k; j
00
) > 0 for j
00
<
k
l implies y

(i; l) = 0 for i 2 I
0
and i <
l
k. But y

(i; l) = x
I
(i; l) for i =2 I
0
, so y

(i; l) = 0 for all i <
l
k
also. These two last fats together with (3) imply d(l) = x
I
(k

; l) = y

(k

; l),
ontraditing the hypothesis that (k; l) bloks y

.
So it may be supposed that k =2 I
0
.
x
I
(k; j) = y

(k; j); j 2 J , so x
I
(k; l

) = y

(k; l

) < s(k), and x
I
(k; l) =
y

(k; l) < (k; l). But x
I
is stable, so x
I
(k

; l) = d(l) whereas y

(k

; l) < d(l).
Thus from (3), x
I
(I; l) = y

(I; l) = d(l) and there exists an i

2 I
0
; i

<
l
k for
whih y

(i

; l) > x
I
(i

; l) = 0.
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Now Lemma 1(iii) shows the ruial fat onerning y: there exists h 
l
i

<
l
k with y(h; l) > x
I
(h; l).
Claim: x
I
(i; l) = y(i; l) for i =2 I
0
. Sine y(h; l) > x
I
(h; l) it follows from (4)
that x
I
(i; l)  y(i; l) for i =2 I
0
and i >
l
h. But x
I
(i; l) = 0 for i <
l
k, so x
I
(i; l) 
y(i; l) for all i =2 I
0
. Sine x
I
(I; l) = d(l) and, from (3), x
I
(I
0
; l) = y(I
0
; l), it
follows that every inequality x
I
(i; l)  y(i; l); i =2 I
0
, must in fat be an equation,
as laimed. Therefore, in partiular, y(k; l) = x
I
(k; l) = y

(k; l) < (k; l).
If y(k; J) < s(k), then y(h; l) > x
I
(h; l) = 0 for h <
l
k shows (k; l) bloks
y. Otherwise, y(k; J) = s(k) and x
I

k
y implies that x
I
(k; J) = s(k). But
x
I
(k; l

) < s(k), so x
I
(k; j
0
) > 0 for some j
0
<
k
l and therefore y(k; j
00
) > 0 for
some j
00

k
j
0
(sine x
I

k
y), so (k; l) bloks y in this ase too.
Monotoniity
If P = ( ; s; d; ) is an alloation problem then P
h
= ( 
h
; s; d; 
h
) is im-
proved over P for employee or row-agent h if the problems are the same exept
that row-agent h may improve in the rankings of one or more olumn-agents:
for j 2 J; h >
j
i in P implies h >
j
i in P
h
and 
h
(h; j)  (h; j):
A mehanism  is employee- or row-monotone if (P
h
) 
h
(P ) whenever
P
h
is an improved alloation problem for any employee or row-agent h. It
seems reasonable that an improvement in the situation of a row-agent h should
translate into the same or a better outome for agent h. Yet examples show
that the olumn-optimal mehanism 
J
is not row-monotone.
Theorem 6 
I
is the unique row-monotone mehanism.
Proof. It is rst shown that 
I
is row-monotone, then that it is the only
row-monotone mehanism.
Take x
I
and x
h
I
to be, respetively, the row-optimal stable alloations for
P and for P
h
, improved over P for row-agent h, and suppose 
I
is not row-
monotone: x
I

h
x
h
I
. Let I
0
= fi 2 I : x
I

i
x
h
I
g 6= ;. I
0
must be a proper
subset of I , by Theorem 4 applied to P
h
. Theorem 5 says that x
I
must be
bloked in P
h
by a node (i; j), i =2 I
0
. But sine h 2 I
0
is the only row-
agent whose position has hanged and it advaned in going from P to P
h
, all
predeessors of (i; j) 2 P
h
are also predeessors of (i; j) 2 P ; and the only
bounds that may inrease are those of row h 2 I
0
. Therefore, (i; j) must blok
x
I
in P too, a ontradition. So 
I
is row-monotone.
Suppose, now, that  is a row-monotone mehanism dierent from the row-
optimal mehanism,  6= 
I
. Then there must exist a problem P with (P ) =
 6= x
I
= 
I
(P ), say x
I

k
 for some k 2 I . Sine  is stable either k() <
k
k(x
I
) = l, or k() = k(x
I
) = l and (k; l) > x
I
(k; l).
Take P
 k
= ( 
 k
; s; d; 
 k
) to be idential to P = ( ; s; d; ) exept that

 k
(k; l) = x
I
(k; l), and that k beomes the least prefered row-agent on the list
of every olumn-agent j who is ranked below l by k (note that x
I
(k; j) = 0 for
suh j). P is an improved problem for k over P
 k
.
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xI
is learly stable in P
 k
. Claim: if y is any stable alloation in P
 k
then
y 
k
x
I
. For suppose the ontrary, namely, x
I

k
y. Then l = k(x
I
) 
k
k(y)
and y
 
k; k(y)

> x
I
 
k; k(y)

so by Theorem 2, y 
k(y)
x
I
. But
 
k; k(y)

has no
predeessor in its olumn, so y
 
k; k(y)

< x
I
 
k; k(y)

, a ontradition.
Let 
 k
def
= (P
 k
). Sine 
 k
is stable, 
 k

k
x
I
. But x
I

k
 so

 k

k
, ontraditing the row-monotoniity of .
Strategy
Agents may play for strategi advantage by not reporting their true prefer-
enes.
If P = ( ; s; d; ) is the true problem then P
0
= ( 
0
; s
0
; d; 
0
) is an alternate
problem for I
0
 I if the two problems are idential exept for the employees or
row-agents I
0
who announe altered preferenes and/or altered quotas s
0
and
bounds 
0
. Sine the s(i) and the (i; j) are true values (indeed, a (i; j) may
be imposed by j 2 J), they annot be violated, so s
0
(i)  s(i) and 
0
(i; j) 
(i; j).
A mehanism  is employee- or row-strategy-proof if when P
0
is an alternate
problem for I
0
of P , (P
0
) 
i
(P ) for all i 2 I
0
is false for any hoie of I
0
 I .
Theorem 7 
I
is the unique row-strategy-proof mehanism.
Proof. First, 
I
is row-strategy-proof. For suppose that there exists a stable
alloation y in P
0
, an alternate problem for I
0
of P , where y is an alloation
preferred by the row-agents I
0
to x
I
in P . Let

I be the set of all row-agents
that prefer y to x
I
. By Theorem 4,

I 6= I , and by Theorem 5 there must exist
some (i; j) with i =2

I that bloks y in P . But the preferenes of i are exatly
the same in P and P
0
, so (i; j) bloks y in P
0
too, a ontradition. So 
I
is
row-strategy-proof.
Suppose now that  is a row-strategy-proof mehanism dierent from the
row-optimal mehanism,  6= 
I
. Then there must exist a problem P with
(P ) =  6= x
I
= 
I
(P ), say, x
I

k
 for some k 2 I .
Let I
0
= fi 2 I : x
I

k
g and dene P
0
= ( 
0
; s; d; 
0
) to be the same as P
exept that
for i 2 I
0
: 
0
 
i; i(x
I
)

= x
I
 
i; i(x
I
)

and 
0
(i; j) = 0 when j <
i
i(x
I
):
x
I
is a stable alloation in P
0
= ( ; s; d; 
0
), and if y is any stable alloation
in P
0
, then learly y 
i
x
I
for all i 2 I
0
. Thus 
0
= (P
0
) satises 
0

i
x
I

i

for i 2 I
0
, ontraditing the fat that  is row-strategy proof.
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